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Abstract: We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both 
have a desire to exact revenge. We show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the 
desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in the open-loop 
equilibrium, the weaker faction exerts a higher effort when the stronger faction’s military 
capability increases. This result is not possible in the absence of a desire for revenge. The 
closed-loop equilibrium is characterized by a self-deterrence effect: Anticipating the 
future retaliation of the opponent, a faction has an incentive to exert lower effort today. 
This strengthens the tendency to a stable steady state and paradoxically may decrease the 
factions’ effort below the levels exerted in the case without revenge. We discuss some 
applications of our results and also offer an explanation of a puzzling empirical result 
obtained by Jaeger and Paserman (2007) in their study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare 
economics and their strategic value as commitment devices. 
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If it will feed nothing else, it will feed my revenge. -  William Shakespeare, The Merchant 
of Venice (Shylock act III) 
 
Revenge is profitable. - Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (ch. XI) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The desire for revenge appears to be a common human trait. As Elster (1990, p. 862) 
observes “[R]evenge - the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering 
upon those who have made one suffer, because they made one suffer - is a universal 
phenomenon.” Knutson (2004) found that the striatum, a key subcortical brain structure 
involved in feeling satisfaction, was activated in human volunteers subjected to PET 
imaging as they played a game designed to elicit acts of revenge. Moreover, in pre-
industrial societies, revenge was seen as an integral part of justice and retribution. This 
still persists in certain societies. Indeed, some people justify capital punishment on the 
grounds that someone who has taken another human being’s life deserves to have this life 
taken (i.e., an eye for an eye). See e.g. Nussbaum (1999, p. 157-158) for a discussion. 
Revenge is often seen as a major cause of continuing conflict over and beyond the 
original cause of the conflict (see, for example, Chagnon, 1988; Kim and Smith, 1993; 
Juah, 2002). Even more, it is sometimes argued that the desire for revenge may 
completely destabilize a conflict since an action by one faction is countered by an action 
of the other faction which is again countered by the first faction and so on. Each faction 
in the conflict may want to “throw the last punch”. Hence, so the argument goes, revenge 
may lead to escalation of the conflict with dramatic or even devastating consequences for 
all factions. For example, commenting on the notoriously famous and bloody 19th century 
feud along the Kentucky-West Virginia backcountry involving the families of the 
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Hatfields and McCoys, 1 Frank (1988, p. 1) observed that “[T]o this day, no one is sure 
how it actually started. But once underway, its pattern was one of alternating attacks, 
each a retaliation for the preceding, and thus also the provocation for the one to follow.” 
The interesting point of this paper is that, in contrast to the above arguments, the 
desire for seeking revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. Paradoxically, 
revenge itself even may be a reason why the conflict is stabilized. We consider a 
differential game of an infinitely-repeated conflict between two factions competing over 
a given resource. In each period, the factions exert effort in order to control the resource. 
Each faction has a desire to exact revenge for past destruction suffered. The destruction 
suffered by a player is a stock that grows according to his opponent’s destructive efforts 
and that depreciates at the rate at which past destruction is forgotten. If in a given period 
a faction wins the conflict, it not only gets utility from the resource itself but also a value 
from exacting revenge. Hence, in our model the desire for revenge is understood as a 
‘prize-enhancing’ phenomenon. 
Within this model, we characterize open-loop and closed-loop equilibria and 
show that, despite the desire for revenge, the conflict may attain a steady state with 
stationary effort levels of the factions. In the open-loop case, it turns out that a stable 
steady state is reached if the decay rate of the stock of destruction is sufficiently high, the 
factions are relatively homogenous and/or the value from seeking revenge is comparably 
low. The results in the closed-loop case are even stronger. Here we identify a self-
deterrence effect. Each faction knows that its opponent will increase future effort if the 
faction increases effort today. Anticipating the retaliation of the opponent, the faction has 
an incentive to exert lower effort today. As consequence of the self-deterrence effect, the 
                                                 
1 See Rice (1982) for an account of the Hatfield-McCoy’s almost forty-year feud. 
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closed-loop equilibrium may attain a stable steady state even if the open-loop equilibrium 
does not. More importantly, the self-deterrence effect may be so strong that the effort 
levels of the factions in the steady state are lower than the effort levels when the factions 
do not have a desire for revenge. This is what we call the paradox of revenge as the 
desire for retaliation has a deescalating impact on the conflict. 
These insights are important. Revenge is often seen a major destabilizing element 
in conflicts. The consequences are expected to be dramatic for the factions with a total 
loss of human life and property. Our results show that this may not be true, but that 
revenge itself may be a reason why conflicts are stabilized. Such a result may help to 
explain why devastating conflicts eventually become stabilized even though it is known 
that the factions have a desire for retaliation. A good example may be the conflict 
between Protestants and the Catholics in Ireland. After a long time of action and 
counteraction, today the effort levels of the two factions is rather low and the conflict 
seems to be almost resolved. Of course, there may be other reasons for the resolution of 
the conflict (e.g. third party intervention), but the self-deterrence effect identified in our 
analysis may also contribute to the explanation of this observation. A similar line of 
reasoning may be applied to the end of the Cold War between the NATO countries and 
the members of the Warsaw Pact during the nineties. 
The preceding point implies that revenge plays a role analogous to tit-for-tat 
strategies in repeated prisoner-dilemma type games insofar the desire to exact revenge 
(i.e., punishment) may lead to socially desirable or co-operative outcomes. However, a 
key difference between tit-for-tat strategy and exacting revenge (as modeled in this 
paper) is that in tit-for-tat, the player who retaliates does not derive utility from the 
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revenge per se. He only derives a positive utility if his retaliatory action causes his 
opponent to co-operate in the future. Hence tit-for-tat – as modeled in repeated games – is 
forward-looking2 while exacting revenge – as modeled in this paper and in reality – is 
backward-looking.3 This distinction is akin to the legal and philosophical discussions of 
punishment for the purpose of deterrence and reform vis-à-vis punishment for the 
purpose of atonement (justice). It is the basis of the legal debate on the merits of 
retributive justice vis-à-vis restorative justice. This difference in perspectives explains 
why some South Africans were not satisfied with the mandate and job of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission4 in post-apartheid South Africa. 
In a recent paper, Jaeger and Paserman (2007) found that in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, violence by the Palestinians is a good predictor of Israeli counter attacks 
(violence). However, the same is not true of the Palestinians. That is, Israeli attacks do 
not predict Palestinian counter attacks. Using our model, we offer an alternative 
explanation of this puzzling result which complements Jaeger and Paserman’s (2007) 
explanation.  
To be sure, there is a wide literature on contests and conflicts. However, our work  
                                                 
2 Commenting on the attractiveness of tit-for-tat, Axelrod (1984, p. 54) observed that “[W]hat accounts for 
tit-for-tat’s robust success is its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving and clear. Its niceness 
prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting 
whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual co-operation. And its clarity makes it 
intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term co-operation.” For a critique of this far-reaching 
claim, see Martinez-Coll and Hirshleifer (1991) and Binmore (1998). 
3 As we argue in our concluding remarks, our revenge equilibria are renegotiation-proof.  
4 The official government webpage of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is http://www. 
doj.gov.za/trc/. The report of the commission is available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/ 
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will be the first in the economics literature to examine revenge in conflicts.5 There is, of 
course, a literature which studies the conditions under which conflicts escalate or end. 
Examples are Nalebuff (1986), Fearon (1994), Carlson (1995), Bester and Konrad 
(2005), Konrad and Kovenock (2005), and Hausken (2008). Carment and Rowlands 
(1998), Siqueira (2003), Chang et al. (2007) and Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) examine 
third-party intervention in conflicts. Garfinkel and Skarpedas (2000) studied how conflict 
can arise in a world of complete information, and Skaperdas (1992) investigated the 
conditions for peace and conflict in world with no property rights. But none of these 
studies has focused on the role of a desire for revenge.6 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a differential game 
model of a conflict between two factions that have a desire for revenge. As a benchmark, 
section 3 derives the equilibrium in the case where the factions do not obtain a benefit 
from retaliation. In Section 4 and 5 we characterize the open-loop and closed-loop 
equilibria, respectively. Section 6 discusses our results and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
5An exception is Jaeger and Paserman (2007) who undertake an empirical analysis of violence in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike economists, the role of revenge in wars, conflicts, and social 
relationships has been studied by philosophers, legal scholars, political scientists, and psychologists. 
Examples are the works of Chagnon (1988), Elster (1990), Stuckless and Goranson (1992), Kim and Smith 
(1993), Suny (1993), Bloom (2001), Juah (2002), Knutson (2004) and Orth (2004). 
6 Our model is also related to that of Wirl (1994) who considers an infinitely-repeated rent-seeking contest 
modeled as a differential game. Similar to our model, a player’s valuation in Wirl’s model depends on a 
state variable which is influenced by his opponent’s efforts and his own effort increases his opponent’s 
valuation. However, there are important differences to our approach. First, Wirl’s model only contains one 
state variable as opposed to two state variables in our model. Second and more importantly, Wirl does not 
take into account the players’ desire to seek revenge. Indeed, even though Wirl also identifies a kind of 
deterrence effect, the missing revenge component in his model implies that he cannot derive the 
paradoxical results that revenge itself leads to stabilization of conflicts and that the effort of the factions 
with the desire for seeking revenge may be lower than without this desire. Finally, his model cannot explain 
the finding in Jaeger and Paserman (2007). 
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2. A model of revenge in conflicts 
Consider two factions, 1 and 2, in an infinitely-repeated conflict (war). The beginning of 
time is period 0. The original cause of the conflict is a given resource. For example, in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict the resource may be land which is used for settlements. The 
factions compete for this resource in every period t. Denote the effort that faction i = 1, 2 
expends in order to win the conflict in period t by xi(t). Effort of faction i causes a cost 
denoted by the function Ci[xi(t)] which is increasing and convex, i.e. 0)]t(x[C i
i
xi
>  and 
0)]t(x[C i
i
xx ii
>  where subscripts denote derivatives. We allow the cost function to be 
different for the two factions so that the conflict may be among heterogeneous players. 
The faction with the higher military capability has the lower cost of effort. Note that we 
do not make a distinction between offensive effort and defensive effort. This would 
complicate the model without affecting our main results. Indeed, the distinction is not 
necessary insofar as offensive effort could also be a form of defense. 
The probability that faction i wins the conflict in period t is given by the contest 
success function Pi[xi(t), xj(t)], where i = 1, 2, j ≠ i. The contest success function satisfies 
0)]t(x),t(x[P ji
i
x i
> ,        (1) 
0)]t(x),t(x[P ji
i
x j
< ,        (2) 
2
1]x,x[Pi = .         (3) 
According to (1) and (2), a faction’s winning probability is increasing in the faction’s 
own effort and decreasing in the effort of the faction’s opponent. Equation (3) states that 
equal efforts levels imply an equal winning probability of one half for both factions. 
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These properties define a modest set of conditions imposed on the contest success 
function. They are satisfied by, for example, Tullock’s ratio-form function 
Pi[xi(t), xj(t)] = xi(t)
η/[xi(t)
η + xj(t)
η] and Hirshleifer’s difference-form function 
Pi[xi(t), xj(t)] = exp{ηxi(t)}/[exp{ηxi(t)} + exp{ηxj(t)}] with η > 0.  
If a faction is successful in the period t conflict, it controls the resource. The 
direct benefit of using and possessing the resource in a given period is denoted by v > 0. 
For simplicity, we assume that this benefit is time independent and the same for both 
factions. Moreover, there is a second benefit from being successful in the conflict, 
namely a value of revenge. Effort by the factions results in the destruction of human life 
and property. This destruction fuels the conflict and creates the desire for revenge. Note 
that in each period, the resource (e.g., land) is up for grabs. This assumption allows us to 
compare our results to the benchmark case where there is no revenge but there is a 
contest over the resource in every period. It is also consistent with real-world conflicts 
like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where exacting revenge and fighting over land occur 
simultaneously or appear to be inextricably linked. 
In period t, the value of revenge to faction i is given by 
)]t(s[R)t(R ji = ,        (4) 
where sj(t) denotes the accumulated stock of destruction inflicted by faction j on faction i. 
The revenge function R is supposed to satisfy 
,0)t(sif,0)]t(s[R jj >>        (5) 
,0)t(sif,0)]t(s[R jj ==        (6) 
 0)t(sallfor,0)]t(s[R jjs j ≥> .      (7) 
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Equation (5) means that a faction has a positive valuation for revenge, if the cumulative 
destruction of its property and human life caused by the other faction is positive. 
According to (6), the valuation is zero, if there has not been any loss of human lives or 
property. Equation (7) states that the higher is the cumulative destruction suffered the 
higher is the value of revenge.7 
The accumulated stock of destruction inflicted by faction i on faction j evolves 
through time according to the law of motion 
)t(s)t(x)t(s iii δ−=& ,        (8) 
with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and the initial condition si(0) = si0. Equation (8) shows that in period t the 
accumulated stock of destruction increases with faction i’s effort in period t and may 
decay at rate δ . Decay is due to the fact that, for example, destroyed buildings are rebuilt 
resulting in people forgetting some (if 0 < δ < 1) or all (if δ = 1) of the past destruction of 
buildings and so may no longer receive a value of revenge from it. People may also 
forget past destruction or their desire for revenge may wane even if there is no such 
reconstruction of buildings. 
The instantaneous net benefit of faction i in period t equals the expected prize of 
winning the conflict, Pi[xi(t),xj(t)][v + R[sj(t)]], less the effort cost, C
i[xi(t)]. The present 
value of faction i’s net benefit can therefore be written as 
                                                 
7It is important to note that revenge is fueled by past destruction not current destruction. Hence, it may be 
argued that the past stock of destruction sj(t-1) instead of the current stock sj(t) should determine the value 
of revenge in period t. But in a continuous-time framework like ours this distinction vanishes. Formally, 
suppose the length of a time period in a discrete-time framework is not unity but some ε > 0. The past stock 
of destruction is then given by sj(t-ε), and the continuous-time framework is attained in the limiting case of 
ε → 0 where the length of a time period becomes zero. 
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dte)]}t(x[C)]]t(s[Rv[)]t(x),t(x[P{W rt
0
i
i
jji
ii −∞∫ −+=     (9) 
where r > 0 is the common discount rate. Faction i maximizes (9) subject to the law of 
motion in equation (8). This formulation makes visible that our modeling emphasizes the 
‘prize-enhancing’ property of revenge: Revenge acts as if it increases the prize a faction 
obtains when it wins the conflict, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the stock 
of destruction inflicted by the other faction in the past.8 
Our model may omit several of aspects revenge in real world conflicts. For 
example, our framework implicitly assumes that a faction obtains a benefit from revenge 
only if it is successful in the conflict. In real world conflicts, a benefit from revenge may 
also accrue to the loser of the conflict. But this effect can easily be integrated in our 
model without changing the main insights. To see this, assume that faction i’s benefit 
from revenge is Z[sj(t)] if it wins the conflict in period t and γZ[sj(t)] with γ < 1 if it loses 
the conflict in period t. The latter event takes place with probability 1 – Pi[xi(t),xj(t)]. The 
condition γ < 1 means that the value of revenge is lower if the faction loses the conflict 
than if it wins the conflicts, which seems to be a plausible assumption. Defining 
R[sj(t)] := (1 – γ)Z[sj(t)], the instantaneous net benefit of faction i in period t reads 
Pi[xi(t),xj(t)][v + R[sj(t)]] + γZ[sj(t)] – C
i[xi(t)]. Hence, the only difference to the 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that the positive value of revenge does not reflect masochistic preferences. A 
faction does not derive satisfaction from suffering destruction. Destruction is costly to the victim. However, 
given that destruction has been suffered in the past, the victim derives satisfaction from exacting revenge. 
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instantaneous net benefit in equation (9) is the term γZ[sj(t)]. It is straightforward to show 
that this term leaves our results qualitatively unchanged.9 
Moreover, one may argue that our modeling of revenge ignores the possibility 
that past destruction is forgotten or taken out of future revenge-seeking calculus after it 
has been successfully avenged. We do not make this assumption for several reasons: 
First, the destruction suffered by a faction is narrated by older generations to younger 
generations, regardless of whether they were successfully avenged. Long-standing foes 
continually remind themselves of the destruction suffered from the other group. Such 
constant reminders could bring back memories of past destruction that was successfully 
avenged.10 Second, the avenger will invariably suffer some losses in the current period 
even if the revenge was successful. Hence, current destruction suffered in the process of 
exacting revenge or an enemy’s destructive response to one’s previous revenge could 
bring back memories of past destruction that was successfully avenged. Revenge may 
create a cycle of animosity which may draw its momentum from past destruction suffered 
several periods ago. Third, in a study of crime victims, Orth (2004) found that perpetrator 
punishment only transitorily satisfied victims’ feelings of revenge. Hence, the feeling of 
revenge may survive for several periods even if the perpetrator has already been 
punished. Fourth, one of the key results of this paper is that a conflict need not escalate 
even if there is the desire for revenge. If we were to assume that past destruction is 
completely forgotten after it has been successfully avenged we would be making an 
                                                 
9 In the open-loop case this term only affects the dynamics of the co-state variables, but leaves unaltered the 
choice of effort levels and the dynamics of the state variables. Under the closed-loop assumption, we can 
find examples similar to those derived in the subsequent analysis even if the term γZ[sj(t)] is present. 
10 Indeed, the revenge function (i.e., satisfaction from revenge) could change over time depending how 
radical the current generation is relative to previous generations. For simplicity, we keep the revenge 
function constant and only allow the state variables to change over time. 
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assumption that necessarily biases our results towards this non-escalation outcome. 
Instead, we show that a conflict need not escalate even if successfully-avenged 
destruction is not forgotten. 
Furthermore, since in our model the desire for seeking revenge is motivated by 
the past, it goes against economists’ intuition of letting bygones be bygones. In standard 
economics, it is usually argued that sunk costs should not matter. However, in reality, 
sunk costs matter.11 And one such example is the desire to exact revenge. This desire may 
stem from preferences that reflect loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For 
example, in a war, one may want to exact revenge because not doing so is tantamount to 
losing the war (McAfee et al, 2007). 
Finally, it may be argued that our model ignores the fact that destruction by one 
faction imposes a direct cost on the other faction. Such a direct cost may be incorporated 
in our analysis by subtracting from the instantaneous net benefit of faction i the term 
βxj(t) with β > 0. However, this would leave our results qualitatively unchanged: In the 
open-loop case, faction i takes as given the effort of faction j so that the additive term 
βxj(t) does not change the choice of faction i. The term will enter the optimality 
conditions under the closed loop assumption, but it can be shown that the conclusions 
derived form our analysis of this case are not changed. Indeed, we can show that the main  
conclusion of our closed-loop analysis is strengthened (see footnote 17).12 
                                                 
11 See the examples in McAfee et al., (2007) and the references therein. 
12 A further point is that a faction’s value of revenge may depend not only positively on the stock of 
destruction of the other faction, but also negatively on its own stock of destruction, i.e. Ri(t) = R[si(t),sj(t)] 
with RSi[.] < 0. Our analysis ignores this kind of ‘relative’ revenge. A possible argument is the 
psychological phenomenon, formalized by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where gains (in this case, 
destruction inflicted on others) are weighted less than losses (i.e., destruction suffered). Here we assume 
that past destruction inflicted on others is completely disregarded in a faction’s revenge-seeking calculus. 
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3. Equilibrium without revenge 
As a benchmark we consider the case without revenge. This is obtained as a special case 
of the model presented in the previous section when we set R[sj(t)] ≡ 0 so that there is no 
prize-enhancing effect of revenge. Faction i’s dynamic optimization problem in (8) and 
(9) then boils down to a continuum of static maximization problems, i.e. in every period t 
faction i maximizes the instantaneous net benefit Pi[xi(t),xj(t)] v – C
i[xi(t)]. The first 
order condition of this maximization problem is 
 )]t(x[Cv)]t(x),t(x[P i
i
xji
i
x ii
= .      (10) 
This first order condition is the same as in the standard conflict model without revenge. It 
equates the expected marginal prize and the marginal cost of effort. Equation (10) for 
i = 1, 2 determines the equilibrium effort levels of both factions. These equilibrium effort 
levels imply a time path for the factions’ stock of destruction according to the law of 
motion (8). However, in the absence of a desire to exact revenge, there is no feedback of 
the stock of destruction on the equilibrium effort levels. Hence, the effort levels are 
stationary in the sense that they are the same in every period. 
To illustrate and for later purpose we introduce specific functional forms of the 
cost functions and the contest success function. The cost functions are assumed to be 
quadratic, i.e. C[xi(t)] = ci xi(t)2 / 2 with c1, c2 > 0. In case of heterogeneous factions we 
assume, without loss of generality, that c1 < c2 so that, following a standard interpretation 
in the literature on contests, faction 1 is the stronger faction. The contest success function 
is supposed to be linear 
 13
)]t(x)t(x[
2
1)]t(x),t(x[P jiji
i −η+=       (11) 
with η > 0. Such a linear difference-form function is used, for example, by Che and Gale 
(2000). For our purpose, the functional form in equation (11) is easier to work with than 
the Tullock ratio-form or the Hirshleifer difference-form contest success function. At the 
same time, (11) satisfies the basic properties defined by (1) – (3). Note also that the 
parameter η can be interpreted in the same way as in the Tullock and Hirshleifer 
functions. It reflects the sensitivity of the winning probability with respect to the effort 
levels. 13 
Using this specification of our model in (10) and (8) and indicating the 
equilibrium values in the case without revenge by a tilde yields 
 
i
i c
v)t(x~ η= ,         (12) 
 ti0iii e)s
~s(s~)t(s~ δ−∞∞ −+= ,       (13) 
with 
 
i
i c
vs~ δ
η=∞ .         (14) 
For later reference two observations are important. First, the equilibrium effort level of 
faction i in (12) is decreasing in its cost parameter ci, but independent of faction j’s cost 
parameter cj. The latter result is due to the linear contest success function,14 but we will 
see that this result is not true when the factions have a desire to exact revenge. Second, 
                                                 
13 In contrast to the Tullock and Hirshleifer functions, we have to assume that the term η[xi(t) - xj(t)] is 
smaller than one half in absolute terms since otherwise the winning probabilities of the factions may 
become negative and/or larger than one. 
14 In game-theoretic terms, each player has a strictly dominant strategy since player i’s best-response 
function is independent of player j’s effort level. This also means that the equilibrium is unique. 
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according to (13) and (14), faction i’s stock of destructions will always attain a stable 
stationary state ∞is~ as long as the decay rate δ is positive. In the next section, we will 
show that revenge may change the stability properties of the conflict. 
 
4. Open-loop equilibrium 
Let us now turn to the case with revenge. The maximization problem defined by (8) and 
(9) then becomes a dynamic problem since faction i’s net benefit is affected by faction j’s 
stock of destruction. This strategic interdependence is the reason why we obtain a non-
cooperative differential game between the two factions. We first look for an open-loop 
equilibrium and later find a closed-loop (Markovian) equilibrium of this game.  
In the context of exacting revenge, an open-loop equilibrium may be appropriate 
for several reasons. First, under open-loop strategies the factions condition their effort 
levels on calendar time only. As noted by Hume (1898), revenge is an emotionally 
charged reaction leading people who seek revenge to knowingly ignore certain 
consequences of their actions.15 When people decide to take revenge, they may not take 
into account the possibility that their actions could lead to retaliation by their opponent. 
They just do it (i.e., seek revenge). This is consistent with the rationale behind the open-
loop strategy where the feedback through the state variable (i.e., the level of accumulated 
destruction) is ignored by a faction. Second, an open-loop equilibrium is based on the 
                                                 
15 Hume (1898, appendix II) notes that  “[W]ho see not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, 
may be so eagerly pursued as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, and safety 
and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an enemy.” This, 
however, does not mean that the desire for revenge is not driven by some modicum of rational decision 
making. It is only less so. Romer (2000) presents a model and examples of how our feelings (emotions) and 
thoughts affect our decision-making. The fact remains though, as echoed by Hume, that people could go to 
great lengths to exact revenge. 
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assumption that each player can pre-commit to a time-path of actions. Since the desire for 
revenge is an emotion, this ability to commit is supported by Frank’s (1988) argument 
that emotions are the production functions for pre-commitment. Furthermore, to the 
extent that revenge is a form of punishment, our open-loop analysis is supported by 
recent experimental work by Casari and Luini (2006) which showed that experimental 
subjects did not value punishment for its deterrence but instead for the satisfaction of 
retaliating and these punishment choices were made with little strategic reasoning. In 
sum, even though the nature of strategies is an empirical question, the arguments above 
suggest that it is worthwhile to investigate the open loop case. Indeed, as we later show, 
our open-loop equilibrium sheds some light on a finding in Jaager and Paserman (2007). 
Under the open-loop assumption faction i maximizes the present value of its net 
benefit in (9) subject to the law of motion (8). In doing so, it takes as given the time path 
of faction j’s effort level xj(t). The current-value Hamiltonian for faction i is 
]s)t(x[]sx[)x(C)]s(Rv)][t(x,x[PH jjiiiii
i
jji
ii δ−µ+δ−λ+−+= .  (15) 
where λi and µi represent the co-state variables associated with the stock of destruction of 
faction i and the stock of destruction of faction j, respectively. Applying the maximum 
principle yields the following optimality conditions 
0)x(C)]s(Rv)][t(x,x[P ii
i
xjji
i
x ii
=λ+−+ ,     (16) 
i
i
sii )r(Hr i λδ+=−λ=λ& ,       (17) 
)s(R)]t(x,x[P)r(Hr jsji
i
i
i
sii jj
−µδ+=−µ=µ& .    (18) 
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The co-state variable λi measures the shadow prize of the state variable si. Under the 
open-loop assumption, the state variable si does not affect faction i’s instantaneous net 
benefit and, thus, has no value for faction i. It follows λi = 0.16 Inserting this finding into 
equation (15) gives 
 0)x(C)]s(Rv)][t(x,x[P i
i
xjji
i
x ii
=−+ .     (19) 
This equation looks very similar to the corresponding equation (10) in the case without 
revenge. It equates the expected marginal prize and the marginal effort cost of faction i. 
However, there is an important difference. The expected marginal prize now depends not 
only on v, but also on the value of revenge R. As the latter depends on the stock of 
destruction of faction j, it follows that the equilibrium effort level of faction i need not be 
stationary except in a steady state: Faction i’s choice of effort in a given period affects the 
stock of destruction inflicted by faction i on faction j and, thus, faction j’s choice of effort 
in the next period via the value of revenge. This in turn influences the stock of 
destruction inflicted by faction j on faction i and faction i’s choice of effort in the period 
thereafter. In sum, the effort levels of the factions may change over time. 
In order to illustrate the consequences of this insight, we again refer to the 
quadratic cost functions and the linear contest success function in (11). In addition, 
assume that the value of revenge is linear in the stock of destruction, i.e., R(sj) = αsj with 
                                                 
16 Formally, λi(t) = 0 follows from (17) and the transversality condition lim t→∞ e-rt λi(t) si(t) = 0 which has 
to be satisfied for all feasible time paths of the state variable si(t). To see this, note that the solution to the 
differential equation (17) reads λi(t) = Ke(r+δ)t where K is a given constant. Inserting into the transversality 
conditions gives lim t→∞ Keδ t si(t) = 0. As this condition has to be satisfied for all si(t), it follows K = 0 and, 
thus, λi(t) = 0 as stated. 
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 α > 0. Using these specifications in (19) and solving with respect to faction i’s effort 
yields 
∗∗ ηα+η= j
ii
i scc
vx ,        (20) 
where the star indicates optimal values under the open loop assumption. For 
interpretative purposes note that we can write (20) as xi
* = (η/ci) [v + R(sj
*)]. In the open-
loop equilibrium, player i treats the time path of xj and, for that matter sj, as fixed. It 
follows that player i in each period sees himself as being in a stationary (static) contest 
with prize v + R(sj). This is analogous to the case without revenge where in each period a 
contest with prize v takes place. But with revenge the conflict shifts over time because 
each faction’s value of revenge, R(·), changes with time. In this sense the open-loop 
equilibrium with revenge is stationary but with a different prize in each period. 
Inserting (20) into the state equation (8) yields 
∗∗∗ ηα+δ−η= j
i
i
i
i sc
s
c
vs& .       (21) 
With i = 1, 2, j ≠ i, equation (21) represents a two-dimensional system of linear 
differential equations in s1 and s2. Determining the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of 
this system yields the solution 
 t
i
jjiit
i
jjii*
i
*
i 21 ec2
ckck
e
c2
ckck
s)t(s θθ∞
++−+=    (22) 
where 
21
1 cc
αη−δ−=θ ,  
21
2 cc
αη+δ−=θ      (23) 
represent the eigenvalues of (21) and where 
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22
ji
2
j*
i
cc
)c(v
s αη−δ
ηα+δη=∞         (24) 
is the steady state value of accumulated destruction inflicted by faction i on faction j. 
Moreover, *i0ii ssk
∞−=  is a given constant measuring the difference between the initial 
value and the steady state value of accumulated destruction. 
In the case without revenge, we found that the conflict is stationary and leads to a 
stable steady state. The stability of the open-loop equilibrium with revenge is determined 
by the eigenvalues given by (23). The dynamics of the stock of destruction yields a stable 
steady state if and only if both eigenvalues are negative. While θ1 is always negative, θ2 
may be non-negative. However, θ2 < 0 if ηα>δ 21cc . This condition also ensures that 
*
is
∞ > 0 for i = 1, 2. This immediately proves 
Proposition 1: If factions in a conflict use open-loop strategies and have a desire to 
exact revenge, then the conflict reaches a steady state if and only if ηα>δ 21cc . 
This is an important result. At first glance, one might think that revenge necessarily 
destabilizes the conflict. An increase in effort of faction i raises the value of revenge and 
effort of faction j. This in turn raises the value of revenge and effort of faction i, and so 
on. Proposition 1 shows that despite such a ‘spiral of violence’ the conflict may not 
escalate but may reach a steady state with stationary effort levels of both factions. 
The existence of a steady state depends on the model parameters. From the 
condition ηα>δ 21cc  we obtain 
 
 
 19
Corollary 1: If factions in a conflict use open-loop strategies and have a desire to exact 
revenge, then the conflict reaches a steady state if, ceteris paribus, 
(a) the decay rate δ is relatively high, 
(b) the revenge parameter α is relatively low, 
(c) the difference between the cost parameters c1 and c2  is relatively low. 
Proof: The proof of (a) and (b) is straightforward from the condition ηα>δ 21cc . In 
order to prove (c) suppose c1 and c2 satisfy c1 + c2 = c . Then c1c2 is maximized at 
c1 = c2 = c /2 and it is smaller the bigger is the difference between c1 and c2. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1 identifies forces that may stabilize the conflict even in the presence of the 
desire for seeking revenge. According to (a) the conflict reaches a steady state if the 
decay rate is sufficiently large since then a relatively large part of past destruction is 
forgotten and the incentive for exerting revenge is weakened. The same is true if the 
desire for revenge per se is relatively low as shown by point (b). Point (c) states that a 
conflict between relatively homogenous factions is less likely to escalate than a conflict 
between relatively heterogeneous factions. The reason is that in a heterogeneous conflict 
the faction (say faction i) with a very high military capability (i.e., very low ci) exerts a 
very high level of effort according to (20). This increases the destruction imposed on the 
faction (say faction j) with the very low military capability (i.e., high cj) which 
significantly increases his value from revenge. So while faction j has a high cj, its high 
value of revenge stemming from faction i’s action causes it to increase effort 
substantially. This, in turn, causes faction i to increase its effort resulting in an unending 
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vicious cycle of revenge. In a conflict among homogenous factions this effect is less 
severe so that the conflict need not escalate but instead reaches a steady state. 
If a steady state is attained, the corresponding effort levels are obtained by 
inserting (24) into (20). Straightforward calculations yield the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Suppose factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge 
and use open-loop strategies. If the conflict reaches a steady state, then aggregate effort 
and aggregate destruction are both increasing in the difference between the military 
capabilities of the factions. 
Proof: From (20) and (24) we obtain  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
αη−δ
+ηα+δ++η=∞+∞ 22
2c1c
2
2c1c/)2c1c(2
2c1c
2c1cv*2x
*
1x  
Holding c1 + c2 fixed, it is obvious that aggregate effort in the steady state is decreasing 
in c1c2. Then it follows from the first part of the proof of corollary 1 that aggregate effort 
in the steady state is higher, the bigger is the absolute difference between c1 and c2 
holding c1 + c2 fixed. The proof for aggregate destruction in the steady state is 
straightforward. QED. 
 The intuition for this proposition is very similar to the intuition given above for 
part (c) of corollary 1. Hence, we would not repeat it here. However, we will discuss this 
proposition in a subsequent section. 
 We also obtain the following proposition:  
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Proposition 3: Suppose factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge 
and use open-loop strategies. If the conflict reaches a steady state, then the 
corresponding effort levels are decreasing in the decay rate, δ, and increasing in the 
benefit of revenge parameter, α. Moreover, the steady state effort level of faction i is not 
only inversely related to ci but also to cj. 
Proof: From (24) and (20) we obtain 
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This proves the proposition. (Q.E.D.) 
If the decay rate is relatively high, the stock of destruction is relatively low. 
Hence, the factions desire to seek revenge is comparably weak so that the steady state 
effort levels are relatively low as shown by the first part of Proposition 2. The rationale of 
the second part is as follows: If faction i has high cost of effort, it exerts low effort to win 
the conflict. This is the same effect as in the case without revenge. However, with 
revenge, there is additional effect where the effort cost of faction j affects the effort level 
of faction i. If the effort cost of faction j increases, then faction j invests less effort in the 
conflict and has a lower stock of destruction in the steady state. As a consequence, 
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faction i’s value from exacting revenge declines with the consequence that faction i’s 
effort falls. 
 Even though we have shown that the factions’ desire for exacting revenge need 
not lead to an escalation of the conflict, it should be noted that the steady state effort 
levels in the open-loop case with revenge are always higher than the effort levels in the 
case without revenge (compare equation (20) with equation (12)). This will be an 
important point when we now turn to the closed-loop case. 
 
5. Closed-loop equilibrium 
The assumption of closed-loop (Markovian) strategies has the advantage that it does not 
require pre-commitment of the factions and that it yields subgame perfect solutions.  
In contrast to open-loop strategies, closed-loop strategies assume that the factions 
do not condition their effort in period t on calendar time t, but on the state variables in 
period t, i.e. faction i’s strategy can be written as )]t(s),t(s[)t(x ji
i
i Φ= . Faction i now 
still takes as given the strategy of faction j, but in choosing the effort level it takes into 
account that faction j’s effort depends on the stock of destruction via the closed-loop 
assumption. The Hamiltonian of faction i is therefore  
]s)s,s([]sx[)x(C)]s(Rv)][s,s(,x[PH jij
j
iiiii
i
jij
j
i
ii δ−Φµ+δ−λ+−+Φ= . 
Applying the maximum principle yields 
0)x(C)]s(Rv][[P ii
i
xj
i
x ii
=λ+−+⋅ ,      (25) 
)()(][P)]s(Rv[)r(Hr jsi
j
s
i
xji
i
sii iiji
⋅Φµ−⋅Φ⋅+−λδ+=−λ=λ& ,  (26) 
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)()(][P)]s(Rv[)s(R][P)r(Hr jsi
j
s
i
xjjs
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i
sii jjjjj
⋅Φµ−⋅Φ⋅+−⋅−µδ+=−µ=µ& . 
(27) 
The key difference between these optimality conditions and the optimality conditions in 
(16) – (18) in the open-loop case are the last two terms on the RHS of (26) which contain 
the impact of faction i’s stock of destruction on faction j’s effort level, i.e., (.)jsiΦ . This 
impact is ignored by faction i under the open-loop assumption (implying λi(t) = 0 for all 
t) but is taken into account by faction i in the closed-loop case. Through two new 
channels, it influences the shadow price of faction i’s stock of destruction (λi) and, via 
equation (25), faction i’s choice of effort. First, if faction i increases its effort and stock 
of destruction, faction j’s incentive to seek revenge becomes stronger. As a consequence, 
faction j raises its effort level and stock of destruction so that faction i’s value of revenge 
goes up. This value effect is reflected by the last term in (26), i.e. (.)jsi iΦµ . Compared to 
the open-loop case, it increases λi and gives faction i the incentive to exert more effort. 
Second, in the closed-loop equilibrium we have a self-deterrence effect: If faction i’s 
effort and stock of destruction are increased, faction j will exert more effort so that 
faction i’s probability of winning declines. Formally, this effect is reflected by  
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)(][P)]s(Rv[ js
i
xj ij
⋅Φ⋅+  in equation (26).17 Compared to the open-loop equilibrium, it 
lowers λi and provides faction i with the incentive to invest less effort. 
We think that the self-deterrence effect is the more interesting effect since, on  
one hand, it is triggered by the desire to seek revenge and, on the other hand, it reduces 
(!) the factions’ incentive to exert effort in the conflict. In order to investigate the 
implications of this paradoxical effect, we now calculate explicit solutions for the closed-
loop equilibrium. In most differential games, analytical closed-loop equilibria are very 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (see, for example, Driskill and McCafferty, 1989, 
Wirl, 1994; Wirl and Feichtinger, 2002; Jun and Vives, 2004). This is particularly the 
case since our differential game has two state variables. Nevertheless, a numerical 
analysis of the closed-loop can provide important information on the implications of the 
self-deterrence effect. 
To see this, we focus on the linear-quadratic model specification already 
introduced above and use the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) approach. Let Vi(si,sj) be 
the value function of faction i. This function has to satisfy the HJB equation 
                                                 
17 If the effort of faction j causes a direct cost of destruction on faction i, the term )s,s( ij
jΦβ−  
additionally enters the Hamiltonian of faction i. The self-deterrence effect then becomes 
)(]][P)]s(Rv[[ js
i
xj ij
⋅Φβ−⋅+ . This shows that with a direct cost of destruction, the self-deterrence effect is 
larger than without this direct cost. Intuitively, in choosing its effort level today, a faction takes into 
account that the corresponding increase in the opponent’s future effort level not only reduces its winning 
probability, but also increases the direct cost of destruction suffered. Hence, the incentive to reduce effort 
today becomes even stronger when we consider the case of β > 0, compared to the case of β = 0. 
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for every (si,sj). Carrying out the maximization in (28) gives 
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Inserting (29) back into (28) yields 
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This is a partial differential equation for the value function Vi. For the sake of tractability, 
we focus on the symmetric case with ci = c and si0 = s0. As a solution of (30), we try the 
linear-quadratic value function 
ji5
2
j4j3
2
i2i10ji
i sszszszszszz)s,s(V +++++= .    (31) 
The z’s are constants that have to be determined such that the value function (31) satisfies 
the HJB equation (30). Note that the z’s are the same for both players because we focus 
on  symmetric players. Using equation (31) in (29), the effort level of faction i in the 
closed-loop equilibrium can be written as 
j
5
i
21
ji
i s
c
zs
c
z2
c
zv)s,s( +ηα+++η=Φ .     (32) 
Inserting this expression and the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium ( sˆ:ss ji == ) 
into the law of motion in (8) gives 
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Equation (33) is an ordinary differential equation determining the dynamics of the 
(common) stock of destruction. The dynamics lead to a stable and positive steady-state 
level of destruction if and only if  
 0
c
zv 1 >+η ,  0
c
zz2 52 <δ−++ηα .    (34) 
The next proposition identifies model specifications for which such stable steady states 
exist and compares it with the open-loop equilibrium and the equilibrium when the 
factions do not have the desire to exact revenge. 
Proposition 4: Suppose factions in a conflict are motivated by the desire to seek revenge 
and use closed-loop strategies. Then there exists model specifications for which the 
closed-loop equilibrium attains a stable steady state, even if the open-loop equilibrium 
does not. More importantly, the effort levels of the factions in the steady state of the 
closed-loop equilibrium may be lower than the effort levels in the case without revenge. 
Proof: We first have to determine those values of (z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) that ensure that 
(31) satisfies the HJB equation (30). Using (31) and (32) in (30) and sorting terms gives 
0sskskskskskk ji5
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2
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c2
)z2zv)(zv(
2
vrzk 31100
−−η+η+−= ,     (36) 
c
)z2(z
c
z)z(
c
zz
c
)z2(vrzk 213551211
δ−−+ηα−−ηα−η−= ,  (37) 
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The HJB equation in (35) is satisfied if and only if k0 = k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = k5 = 0 (note 
that the HJB equation has to be satisfied for all (si,sj)). This is a system of six ordinary 
equations in the six unknowns z0, z1, z2, z3, z4 and z5. As already mentioned above, an 
analytical solution is not possible. Hence, we demonstrate the proposition by way of  an 
example. Set α = 200, c = 100, r = 0.05, v = 500, δ = 0.3 and η = 1. Note that for this 
parameter constellation we obtain δc – ηα = –170 so that the open-loop equilibrium does 
not attain a steady state according to Proposition 1. In the case without revenge, the 
above parameter constellation implies a steady state effort level 5x~ =∞  and a steady 
state stock of destruction 667.16s~ =∞ . In the closed-loop case, the system of equations 
k0 = k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = k5 = 0 is satisfied by six different sets of values of  
(z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) implying that there are six closed-loop equilibria.18 These 
combinations are listed in the following table: 
 
 
                                                 
18 The multiplicity of closed-loop equilibria in differential games is well known (e.g., Dockner et al, 2000) 
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 z0 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 
solution 1 –83483.6 –486.7 2.8 –32846.6 200.0 –200.0
solution 2 8982.1 –977.1 71.1 696.8 77.6 –83.2
solution 3 10993.0 –1240.4 63.3 829.7 57.7 –51.5
solution 4 93029.6 –493.9 1.4 72955.4 14287.1 –200.0
solution 5 233621.0 255.5 –65.4 1635.3 131.0 –67.1
solution 6 7.1576x107 –13948.8 –64.8 –19384.5 132.4 –64.8
Table 1: Closed-loop equilibria (α = 200, c = 100, r = 0.05, v = 500, δ = 0.3, η = 1) 
For each of these solutions we can check the stability conditions given by equation (34) 
and compute the factions’ effort levels ( xˆ ) and stocks of destruction ( sˆ ) in the (possible) 
steady state. This is done in the following table. 
 
 solution 1 
solution 
2 
solution 
3 
solution 
4 
solution 
5 
solution 
6 
δ−++ηα
c
zz2 52  –0.244 2.290 2.450 –0.272 –0.279 –0.244
c
zv 1+η  0.133 –4.771 –7.404 0.061 7.555 –134.488
sˆ  0.544 2.083 3.022 0.223 27.075 –551.182
xˆ  0.163 0.625 0.907 0.067 8.122 –165.355
Table 2: Steady state of the closed-loop equilibria (a = 200, c = 100, r = 0.05, v = 500, 
δ = 0.3, η = 1) 
Solution 6 can be ruled out since it implies negative effort levels (not only in the steady 
state, but for every period t). Under solutions 1 – 5, in contrast, the closed-loop 
equilibrium attains a steady state with positive effort levels. Three of these solutions 
imply a stable steady state (solutions 1, 4 and 5). This proves the first part of the 
proposition. Moreover, under solutions 1 and 4 the steady state effort level is smaller than 
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the effort level in the conflict without the desire for revenge ( xˆ = 0.163 < 5 = ∞x~  and 
xˆ = 0.067 < 5 = ∞x~ ).  (Q.E.D.) 
The rationale behind Proposition 3 goes back to the self-deterrence effect of 
revenge. Even if the condition for a steady state of the open-loop equilibrium identified in 
Proposition 1 is violated, the self-deterrence effect of revenge may induce the factions to 
reduce their effort levels such that the closed-loop solution attains a stable steady state 
with relatively low effort. Moreover, the self-deterrence effect may even be so strong that 
the intensity of the conflict (measured by the factions’ effort levels) is lower than in a 
conflict where the factions do not have a desire to seek revenge.  
The presence of a desire for revenge need not lead to an escalating conflict. On 
the contrary, as every faction anticipates that the other faction will retaliate tomorrow 
upon an increase in effort today, the factions ceteris paribus have an incentive to reduce 
effort today, and this incentive may be so strong that effort is lower than in the case 
without revenge. Herein lies our first paradox of revenge. As already mentioned in the 
introduction, this line of reasoning may explain why some real-world conflicts do not 
escalate even though it is quite obvious that the factions have the desire to exact revenge.  
 
6. Discussion of results 
Our paradox of revenge result can be given an evolutionary interpretation in the 
sense that revenge may have evolved as way of achieving socially desirable outcomes. 
This point is made by Frank (1988). To be sure, revenge, being a commitment device, 
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can improve a player’s payoff (Schelling, 1960; Crawford, 1982).19 Of course, whether 
we believe that the paradox of revenge result explains what we observe in the real world 
hinges on whether we think warring factions use closed-loop strategies or open-loop 
strategies. While the testability of this result is not easy, it depends on the extent to which 
revenge, being an emotional response, can lead people to ignore the fact that their 
opponent will retaliate in future. It would appear that the real world may have a mix of 
both. That is, some conflicts involve open-loop strategies while others involve closed-
loop strategies. The Hatfield-McCoy feud discussed by Frank (1988) seems to be a good 
example for the open-loop case.20 The conflict of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland and 
the Cold War mentioned in the introduction are examples where factions seem to use 
closed-loop strategies. 
Our argument that the paradox of revenge result is socially desirable is a 
normative one. Yet, in establishing this result we only focused on the costs of the conflict 
to the factions and not its benefits. In particular, we did not include the factions' value 
from exacting revenge in our social welfare evaluation. This is a tricky issue which is 
akin to the problem of doing welfare economics in behavioral economics (Carmichael 
and MacLeod, 2007; Bernheim and Rangel, 2005, 2008). We take the view that including 
the factions’ benefit from revenge in any social welfare calculus will be tantamount to 
arguing that that the factions in our conflict have masochistic preferences. This is not the 
case. Neither faction derives satisfaction from suffering destruction. Such destruction is 
                                                 
19The idea that emotion-based punishment is credible and can improve welfare has been experimentally 
confirmed by Fehr and Gachter (2000). 
20 Commenting on the bloody feud between the McCoys and Hartfield mentioned in section 1, Frank (1988, 
p. 2) noted that “[A]t each juncture, it was clear that to retaliate would produce still another round of 
bloodshed. Yet for almost four decades they persisted.” 
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clearly a cost to them. However, given that destruction has been suffered in the past, the 
victim derives satisfaction from exacting revenge. Having a preference for revenge is like 
having intransitive or inconsistent preferences where an action which was a cost in period 
t becomes a benefit in period t +1.  Arguably, there are other ways of doing welfare 
economics when agents have intransitive preferences, although a general consensus is yet 
to emerge on this issue (see, for example, Carmichael and MacLeod, 2007;  Bernheim 
and Rangel, 2005, 2008). A reader who objects to our interpretation could simply see our 
paradox of revenge result as a positive result instead of a normative result. That is, the 
desire for exacting revenge could paradoxically lead to a smaller aggregate cost of 
conflict. 
Proposition 2 shows that a conflict between two militarily unequal factions could 
be more destructive than a conflict involving equally strong factions. The desire to exact 
revenge accounts for this counter-intuitive result. A weaker faction with no desire to 
exact revenge will not put up a fierce fight if he suffers significant destruction from a 
very strong opponent. However, if the weaker faction derives satisfaction from exacting 
revenge, then the significant destruction will cause him to exert even more effort which 
will, in turn, lead the stronger faction to inflict more destruction on him resulting in a 
vicious circle of actions and counteractions. The history of conflicts is replete with 
examples where a weaker faction has put up a strong resistance against a much stronger 
opponent as in the on-going USA invasion of Iraqi and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The desire to exact revenge may account for the determination and resolve of the weaker  
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faction in these conflicts. 21 
An interesting implication of proposition 3 is that historical narratives of the 
atrocities of one group against another, while useful as a way of understanding the past, 
may also have the undesirable effect of increasing the cost of conflict because they 
reduce the rate at which past destruction is forgotten. This is especially true between 
groups with a history of conflict such as the Israelis and Palestinians, the Serbs and 
Croats, and the Hutus and Tutsis. In contrast, reconstruction assistance such as those 
given to Lebanon after the 1975-1990 war may help in increasing the rate at which past 
destruction is forgotten, although memories of the destruction of human lives is unlikely 
to be affected by such reconstruction assistance. 
Indeed, historical narratives of past atrocities do not only reduce δ but might also 
increase α (i.e., the benefit from exacting revenge). Such stories may be distorted in order 
to promote hatred towards one’s opponents. Glaeser (2005) presents a non-conflict model 
                                                 
21 From equation (12), aggregate effort, when there is no desire for revenge, is ηv(c1 + c2)/c1c2. Hence, with 
no desire for revenge and holding c1 + c2 fixed, aggregate effort is also higher, the more unequal are the 
factions. However, this result arises because our contest success function yields strictly-dominant strategies 
for the factions. It is not driven by the kind of effects discussed above since it is obvious, from equation 
(12), that ∂ ix~ /∂cj = 0 for i ≠ j, i = 1, 2. If we use a different contest success function (say the Tullock 
function) and there is no desire for revenge, then the weaker faction would reduce his effort as the unit 
effort cost of the stronger faction decreases, even if the weaker faction’s cost remains unchanged. This will 
lead to a fall in aggregate efforts (see, for example, Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2007). In contrast when there 
is a desire for revenge, the weaker faction need not reduce his effort when the unit effort cost of the 
stronger faction falls because the stronger faction’s higher effort will increase his accumulated destruction 
inflicted on the weaker faction which will increase his valuation (i.e., the weaker faction’s valuation from 
exacting revenge). This is the rationale behind the result in the latter part of proposition 3. This result is not 
driven by our linear contest success function. While using the Tullock function significantly complicates 
the analysis (e.g., the open-loop case requires the solution to a two-dimensional system of non-linear 
differential equations), our general argument is that the desire to exact revenge could cause a weaker 
faction to increase his effort in response to an increase in effort by a stronger faction. 
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of such “entrepreneurs of hate” or hate-mongering. He argues that policies intended to 
promote integration including inter-marriages will tend to make such stories ineffective 
since these forms of interaction make it easier to verify the truth. However, there is no 
incomplete information in our model, so stories about past atrocities need not be 
distorted. However, their continual repetition across generations with the goal of 
promoting hatred is enough to maintain or increase the utility from exacting revenge or 
decrease the rate at which past destruction is forgotten. 
In repeated games, it is well known that socially desirable or co-operative 
outcomes can be sustained by using punishments such as trigger (grim) strategies. 
However, some of these forms of punishment that support co-operation are not immune 
to renegotiation and so are not credible. Following Farrell and Maskin (1989) and 
Bernheim and Ray (1989), there is now a literature which focuses on renegotiation-proof 
equilibria in repeated games. Renegotiation-proofness is an equilibrium refinement 
that usually narrows the set of subgame-perfect equilibria in a dynamic game. It is 
interesting to note that since revenge is part of a player’s preferences (i.e., he derives 
utility from exacting revenge), it is a credible threat and so punishing one’s opponent is 
not a Pareto-dominated action. It follows that our paradox of revenge result is not only 
socially desirable but also renegotiation-proof. A revenge-induced equilibrium is not 
robust to renegotiation only if the preferences of the players can be changed. It may well 
be that if mediators appeal to the conscience of warring factions and encourage them to 
lay down their arms, they may well be trying to moderate their desire for revenge, so that 
the players would look to the future instead of the past.  
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6.1 Explaining Jaeger and Paserman (2007) result 
In an interesting study on the second Intifada of the Palestinian-Israeli using data on 
fatalities from September 2000 to January 2005, Jaeger and Paserman (2007) found that 
Israeli violence does not seem to result in a predictable counter response from the 
Palestinians. In contrast, they found that Palestinian violence is a good predictor of Israeli 
violence.  
A reason identified by Jaeger and Paserman (2007) is that when the Israelis strike, 
they anticipate that the Palestinians will retaliate so they put increased defensive 
measures like border closings and higher vigilance in place making it difficult for the 
Palestinians to strike back.22 However, after controlling for higher Israeli vigilance after 
an attack, they still find no effect of Israeli violence on Palestinian attacks. They also use 
intended attacks by the Palestinians but this does not change their result. The authors also 
found no deterrence or incapacitation effect or motive for either faction. They conclude 
that Israeli actions can be explained by a revenge motive but the Palestinian actions 
cannot be explained by a revenge or deterrence motive. 
Based on insights from Schelling (1960), the Jaeger and Paserman (2007) explain 
their puzzling result by arguing that the Palestinians may optimally follow a random 
strategy in order to make it difficult for the Israelis to predict when they (i.e., the 
Palestinians) will strike. This is a very plausible explanation. However, it does not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that the Palestinians try to exact revenge. It shows that 
                                                 
22 This means that a forward-looking player can respond to the threat of retaliation in two ways: (a) reduce 
its own destructive effort, or (b) reduce the ability of his opponent to carry out his retaliatory threat. Our 
closed-loop analysis considered the response in (a). 
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if, indeed, the Palestinians are also exacting revenge, it will be difficult to empirically 
detect this motive since they follow a random and unpredictable strategy. 
As mentioned by Jaeger and Paserman (2007), they take an empirical route as 
opposed to solving for a full dynamic and game-theoretic equilibrium of violent behavior 
based on the revenge, incapacitation, and deterrence motives identified in their paper. We 
have provided such a dynamic game based on two of such motives (i.e., revenge and 
deterrence).23 We offer an alternative and complementary explanation to Jaeger and 
Paserman’s (2007) explanation. Our explanation does not depend on mixed or random 
strategies since the equilibria of our game are all in pure strategies. 
Since our model endogenizes the magnitude of attacks in conflicts as opposed to 
the frequency of such attacks, our explanation is more appropriate to Jaeger and 
Paserman's (2007) result pertaining to the number of fatalities than it is to the incidence 
of fatalities.  
The absence of a deterrence effect found by Jaeger and Paserman (2007) makes 
our open-loop equilibrium a good starting point. Jaeger and Paserman (2007) found that 
at 60 days after a fatality, the cumulative impulse response functions for both factions 
almost attain a steady state. Therefore, we will focus on our steady-state open-loop 
equilibrium as a good approximation. 
It is important to note that in our steady state, efforts can only change if one or 
more of the exogenous parameters of the model changes. For the sake of argument, 
suppose there is an increase in the unit effort cost of one faction (i.e., Israel) and a 
                                                 
23 One way to incorporate an incapacitation motive in our model is to write faction i’s  cost of effort as 
C[xi(t)] = (ci + sj)xi(t)2/2. This means that faction i’s unit cost of effort is increasing in the accumulated 
destruction suffered. Solving this model is extremely complicated in the closed-loop case and in the open-
loop case requires the solution to a two-dimensional system of complicated non-linear equations. 
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decrease in the unit effort cost of the other faction (i.e., the Palestinians). As will be 
shown below, this means that there is an increase in Isreali violence in the steady state. 
The corresponding rise in the Palestinian’s unit cost of effort is consistent with Jaeger and 
Paserman’s (2007) finding that Israel increases its defensive measures after launching an 
attack. This increases the cost to the Palestinians of launching a counter attack.  
Let Israel be faction 1 and the Palestinians be faction 2. Since Israel is the 
stronger of the two factions, it follows that 0 < c1 < c2. We can write the change in the 
steady-state efforts of each faction as: 
2dc
2c
*
1x1dc
1c
*
1x*
1dx ∂
∞∂+∂
∞∂=∞           
and 
1dc
1c
*
2x2dc
2c
*
2x*
2dx ∂
∞∂+∂
∞∂=∞         
Given our assumptions, it follows that dc1 < 0 and dc2 > 0. Presumably, the Israelis 
increase their level of vigilance if they increase the level of destruction inflicted on the 
Palestinians. This means that dc1 and dc2 will be correlated. A straightforward and simple 
way of taking this into account is to assume that dc1 = – dc2. 24 Then, 
1dc
2c
*
1x
1c
*
1x*
1dx ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
∞∂−∂
∞∂=∞ .        
This gives 
                                                 
24We assume an exogenous increase and decrease in c2 and c1 respectively. To be sure, the defensive 
measures undertaken by the Israelis are costly. This means this effect should be endogenized. We make this 
assumption for the sake of simplicity.   
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1dc2)2c1c
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1dx δ−αη
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⎛ δ−αη+−ηδαδη
=∞      
Since c1 < c2 and η2α2 – δ2c1c2 < 0 in the steady state, it follows that η2α2 – δ2c2c2 < 0. 
Therefore, 0*1dx >∞  given dc1 < 0. This implies that the stronger faction (i.e., Israel) 
increases its destructive effort.  
 Similarly,  
1dc2)2c1c
222(
1c1c
222)1c2c(
2v
*
2dx δ−αη
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ δ−αη+−ηδαδη
−=∞      
Given c1 < c2 and η2α2 – δ2c1c2 < 0 in the steady state, it is possible that η2α2 – δ2c1c1 < 0.  
Hence, it is possible to have ηδα(c2 – c1) + η2α2 – δ2c1c1 = 0. This gives 0*2dx =∞ . 
Therefore, there is no change in the effort of the weaker faction (i.e., the Palestinians). 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the unit cost of the weaker faction reduces its 
effort. However, this need not change its steady state effort because the increase in the 
stronger faction’s effort increases the weaker faction’s value from exacting revenge. If 
these two opposing effects offset each other, then there will be no change in the weaker 
faction’s effort. This is the intuition for the result that 0*1dx >∞ could lead to 0*2dx =∞ . 
What makes this result increasing is that it is not possible if there is no desire to exact 
revenge. In that case, given our assumptions above and using the equations given by (12), 
would have given 0x~d 1 > and 0x~d 2 < . 
In contrast, notice that a fall in the weaker faction’s unit cost leading to a rise in 
his steady state effort will necessarily result in a rise in the stronger faction’s effort given 
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that the stronger faction’s effort remains unchanged. This is consistent with Jaeger and 
Peserman’s (2007) observation that Israel is sufficiently capable of immediately 
responding to Palestinian attacks. In other words, the Palestinians, unlike the Israelis, 
cannot put in place effective counter defensive measures against the Israelis even if they 
anticipate a counter attack by the Israelis. 
Consistent with Jaeger and Paserman’s (2007) empirical result, our analysis gives 
an explanation for why the coefficients of the effect of Israeli violence on actual or 
intended Palestinian violence may not be significantly different from zero, although a 
revenge motive for the Palestinians is present. This is our second paradox of revenge in 
conflicts. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the implications of the desire for revenge for the 
dynamics of conflicts. We modeled revenge as a prize-enhancing phenomenon where the 
utility from exacting revenge is increasing in the stock of past destruction. Surprisingly, it 
turned out that revenge, understood in this sense, need not destabilize the conflict, but on 
the contrary may itself be a reason why the devastating spiral of action and counteraction 
is broken. We obtained results that offered some insights into the dynamics of real-world 
conflicts. 
In conclusion, we hope that our work has shed some light on our understanding of 
the effect of revenge on the dynamics of conflict and will lead to further work in this 
area. For example, an interesting but very challenging extension is to endogenize 
preferences for revenge. Why are some groups more revenge-driven than others? How 
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should welfare economics be undertaken for parties who have a desire for exacting 
revenge? We leave the analysis of such questions for future research. 
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